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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 










Case No 16089 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~lliNT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Clinton Roberts, was charged with 
a violation of Section 76-6-501, Utah Criminal Code, 
a felony of the second degree, in that on or about the 
24th day of March, 1978, at Utah County, State of Utah, 
the appellant, with purpose to defraud, uttered a bank 
check in the amount of $331.14, purporting to bear the 
signature of David Farmer, knowing at the time that the 
check was forged. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below found the appellant guilty as 
charged, upon a verdict to that effect, and sentenced 
the appellant to confinement in the Utah State Prison 
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for a period of not less than one nor more than fifteen 
years. 
RELII:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order reversing the conviction 
and releasing the appellant from confinement at the 
Utah State Prison. In the alternative, appellant seeks 
an order directing that the appellant be resentenced 
after the appellant and his attorney have been granted 
access to the pre-sentencing report, and opportunity to 
be heard upon the relevance or materiality of the evidence 
contained in that report. 
STATD1ENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was charged in an information with a violation 
of Section 76-6-501, U.C.A., accusing him of uttering, 
with a purpose to defraud, a bank check in the amount 
of $331.14, purporting to bear the signature of David 
Farmer, and drawn on the account of All-Weather Insulation 
Company. During the course of the trial, held before 
the Honorable George E. Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, the appellant elected 
to take the stand and testify on his own behalf. Under 
the direct examination, the appellant testified to his 
involvement in the events which lead to the charges 
against him. He substantially denied the charaes and 
testified that he did not utter any check, nor write 
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been uttered. Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor 
opened with the question, whether the appellant had ever 
been convicted of a prior felony. Pursuant to Section 
78-24-9, U.C.A., the appellant was required by law to 
disclose that he had been convicted of a previous felony; 
therefore the appellant answered the question, both as 
to the fact of the previous felony and as to its nature. 
Following the rendering of verdict of guilty and 
prior to sentencing, the appellant requested that he be 
furnished with a copy of the pre-sentence report. 
That request was granted by the court, and the sentencing 
was set for the 8th day of September. Sentencing was 
later reset for the 15th day of September. On that 
date, the appellant and his attorney appeared before 
the court for the sentencing. However, the appellant 
objected at that time that he had not been furnished 
a copy of the pre-sentence report and had not been given 
access to the information contained therein. Despite 
the objection of the appellant, the court, having 
before it a copy of the report, proceeded to sentence 
the appellant, relying upon the information contained 
in the report to deny appellant's pleas for leniency 
and to impose a sentence of confinement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 78-24-9, REQUIRING A WITNESS 
TO DISCLOSE THE FACT OF HIS PREVIOUS CONVICTIOLl, 
OE~IED THE APPELLANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
( 3) 
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THE EQUAL PROTECTION TEST 
A number of analytical tests have been used by 
the courts under the overall category of equal protection, 
and the test to be applied under any set of circumstances 
depends upon the nature of those circumstances. According 
to the United States Supreme Court: 
It is true that this Court has firmly estab-
lished the principle that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not make every minor difference in the 
application of laws to different groups a violation 
of our Constitution. But we have also held many 
times that "invidious" distinctions cannot be 
enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. In determining whether or not a state law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must 
consider the facts and circumstances behind the 
law, the interests which the State claims to be 
protecting, and the interests of those who are 
disadvantaged by the classification. Williams 
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10. 
Thus, the crucial question in this case involves 
a consideration of both the interests of the appellant 
which were violated when he was compelled by law to 
testify as to his prior conviction and the interests 
of the state which are promoted by such a law. This 
is further clarified by the Court in Police Department 
of City of Chicago v. l1osley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 
2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). There, in the context of 
a criminal law which imposed a classification alleged to be 
discriminatory by one who was prosecuted thereunder, 
the Court stated: 
As in all equal protection cases, however, 
the crucial question is whether there is an aopro-
priate governmental interest suitably furthered 
by the differential treatment. See Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 75-77, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253-2:>4, 30 
L.Ed.2d 225(1971); Weber v. Aetne Casualt~ & Suret~ 
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~., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31, L.Ed.2d 
768 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 
92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). 
408 U.S. at 95, 92 S.Ct. at 2290. 
In the context of criminal prosections, then, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that whenever the state 
imposes a differential treatment on different classes 
of persons, that differential treatment must serve 
positively to promote some interest of the state 'flhich 
is rationally related to the discrimination. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
criminal procedures are very closely tied with the 
"fundamental rights" of the defendant; and a less than 
completely "differential" approach must be taken when 
examining state laws in the criminal context. Thus, 
for example, the Court found that a law which required 
criminal appellants to frunish trial transcripts as a 
condition to the processing of their appeals was violative 
of equal protection principles because, under the 
practical circumstances involved, indigent defendants 
were unable to meet the requirement and were thus 
discriminated against through the apolication of the 
law. Since the discrimination did not further the purposes 
of the state in any way, it fell before the constitutional 
challenge. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 
S.Ct. 585 (1956). Similarly, where a law directed the 
commitment of incompetent defendants on terms which were 
harsher than those imposed upon non-criminal incompetants, 
the Court stated: 
( 5) 
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The harm to the individual is just as great 
if the State, without reasonable justification, 
can apply standards making his commitment a permanent 
one when standards generally applicable to all others 
afford him substantial opportunity for early release 
... As we noted above, we cannot conclude that 
pending criminal charges provide a greater justification 
for different treatment than conviction and sentence. 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 729, 729-730, 92 S.Ct. 
1845, 1853-1854 (1972). 
The Court thus made clear its judgment that the fact 
that criminal charges are pending against an accused 
is not alone a justification for allowing the State to 
impose upon him burdens which are not imposed upon others 
in analogous situations. In striking down the law, 
the Court in Jackson recognized that a classification 
affecting the accused's rights in a discriminatory 
way must be based upon a substantial justification which 
is closely related to the classification. 
Therefore, in determining whether the State has 
violated the rights of the appellant by requiring him 
to disclose the facts of his previous conviction, the 
Court must consider whether the purpose for the State's 
requirement is sufficiently important to override the 
appellant's interest in not disclosing his prior conviction 
and whether that purpose is furthered by requiring a 
certain class of persons to disclose such convictions 
while allowing other classes of persons not to disclose 
such evidence. 
THE CLASSIFICATORY SCHEME 
A brief survey of the relevant statutes and rules 
( 6) 
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of the State of Utah reveals the classificatory scheme 
which appellant asserts denies his rights to equal 
protection of the laws. 
First, section 78-24-9, U.C.A. requires that a 
witness, though not required to give evidence which 
would be irrelevant, degrading, or revealing of prior 
misdemeanors, must nonetheless disclose whether or not 
he has been convicted of a felony. The section reads: 
A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his 
answer may establish a claim against himself, but 
he need not give an answer which will have a tendency 
to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor 
need he give an answer which will have a direct 
tendency to degrade his character, unless it is 
to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which 
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness 
must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction 
of felony. 
Second, Rules 21 and 22 of the Rules of Evidence 
prohibit the use of evidence concerning criminal con-
victions not involving dishonesty or false statement, 
evidence of character traits other than truth, honesty, 
or integrity, or evidence of specific instances of 
conduct, but allow by reference to Section 78-24-9 
the use of evidence of prior felonies to establish 
dishonest or untruthful character. Rule 21 states: 
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for 
a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement 
shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing 
his credibility, except as otherwise provided by 
statute. 
Rule 22 states further, in part: 
As affecting the credibility of a witness. 
(c) evidence of traits of his character other than 
truth, honesty, or integrity of their opposites, 
( 7) 
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shall be inadmissible; (d) evidence of specific 
instances of his conduct relevant only as tending 
to prove a trait of his character, shall be inad-
missible. 
Finally, Rule 55 of the Rules of Evidence prohibits 
the use of evidence of prior convictions to show that 
the accused had a disposition to commit crimes; but 
again the rule is subject to the qualification of 
Section 78-24-9, allowing a witness to be compelled 
to disclose evidence of prior convictions even though 
that witness may be the defendant. Rule 55 Reads in 
part: 
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person 
commotted a crime or civil wrong on a specified 
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for 
an inference that he committed another crime or 
civil wrong on another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is 
admissible when relevant to prove some other 
material act. 
For the purposes of this appeal, the appellant 
asserts that these statutes and rules of the State 
of Utah thus create an invidious discrimination against 
him, depriving him of equal protection of the laws, 
by requiring him to admit non-relevant evidence of 
his past; a forced statement of a prior conviction. 
Secondly, the admission of such non-relevant evidence 
minimizes his opportunity for a fair trial upon the 
relevant issues as compared to a defendant not yet 
having been convicted of a previous felony. 
( 8) 
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THE STATE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 
Laws allowing the admission of evidence of the 
previous felony convictions of an accused are usually 
justified on the basis of the value of such evidence 
in impeaching the defendant who takes the witness stand. 
However, a number of courts have recognized that the 
inherent tendency of such evidence to cause prejudice 
against the accused is sufficient reason to limit, if 
not to exclude altogether, the admission of evidence 
concerning previous felony convictions. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
in its opinion in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 
763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), established the rule, now codified 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, that the 
Court must exercise discretion in the admission against 
an accused or evidence of his prior convictions. There, 
in the context of a statute which did not expressly 
mandate the admission of evidence of prior convictions 
against an accused, the court held: 
The statute, in our view, leaves room for the 
operation of a sound judicial discretion to play 
upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular 
case. There may well be cases where the trial judge 
might think that the cause of truth would be helped 
more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story 
than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity 
because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a 
prior conviction. There may well be other cases 
where the trial judge believes the prejudicial 
effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative 
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue 
of credibility. 348 F.2d at 768. 
The court also outlined the factors which a trial 
( 9) 
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court should consider when determining whether evidence 
of prior convictions is sufficiently relevant and 
probative to warrant its admission in spite of its 
prejudicial effect. 
In exercising descretion in this respect, 
a number of factors ~ight be relevant, such as the 
nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal 
record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, 
and, above all, the extent to which it is more 
important to the search for truth in a particular 
case for the jury to hear the defendant's story 
than to know of a prior conviction. 348 F.2d at 769. 
The rationale of Luck was further clarified in 
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C.Cir. 1967), 
where the trial court admitted evidence of the accused's 
previous convi2tlons and the appellate court upheld 
his exercise of discretion in that regard. The reasoninq 
of the court in Gordon is instructive of the type of 
justification which might be required in order to 
uphold the Utah law against a constitutional attack. 
The court declared: 
The rationale of our Luck opinion is important; 
it recognized that a showing of prior convictions 
can have genuine probative value on the issue of 
credibility, but that because of the potential 
for prejudice, the receiving of such convictions 
as i~peachment was discretionary. The defendant 
who has a criminal record may ask the court to weigh 
the probative value of the convictions as to 
the credibility against the degree of prejudice 
which the revelation of his past crimes would cause; 
and he may ask the court to consider whether it is 
more important for the jury to hear his story 
than to know about prior convictions in relation 
to his credibility. 383 F.2d at 939. 
At least one court has recently determined that 
the admission of evidence of prior convictions offends 
the constitutional rights of the defendant, albeit on 
110) 
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due process grounds rather than equal protection grounds. 
Again, examination of that Court's rationale aids us 
in determining whether there might be justification 
for the classificatory scheme created by the Utah laws. 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. Santiago, 
492 P.2d 657 (1971), first discussed the harmful effect 
of such evidence: 
A number of authorities have come to believe 
that when the witness to be impeached is also the 
defendant in a criminal case, the introduction of 
prior convictions on the issue of whether the 
defendant's testimony is credible creates a substantial 
danger that the jury will conclude from the prior 
convictions that the defendant is likely to have 
committed the crime charged. The danger of prejudice 
is scarcely mitigated by an instruction to consider 
the prior convictions only in determining whether 
or not the defendant's testimony is credible. To 
inform the jury in a rape case that the defendant 
has a prior rape conviction and then instruct 
them to consider the conviction only in evaluating 
the defendant's credibility is to recommend "a 
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their 
power, but anybody else." As the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 
426 (1968), [T]here are some contexts in which the 
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of 
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical 
and human limitations of the jury system cannot 
be ignored. 
The court then went on to discount the alleged benefits 
of the admission of prior convictions evidence by reasoning 
in this manner: 
Despite the burden imposed on the defendant's 
right to testify, we might nevertheless sanction 
admission of prior crimes to impeach credibility 
if there were some value outweighing the burdens 
imposed. It is apparent, however, that prior 
convictions are of little real assistance to the 
jury in its determination of whether the defendant's 
testimonv as a witness is credible. When the prior 
crime ha~ nothing to do with dishonesty, there 
( ll) 
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may be no logical connection whasoever between the 
prior crime and the determination of whether the 
defendant may be believed. Even if the crime involves 
dishonesty or false statements, in light of the fact 
that every criminal defendant may be under great 
pressure to lie, the slight added relevance which 
even a perjury conviction may carry would not seem 
to justify its admission. Furthermore, since the 
jury is presumably qualified to determine whether 
or not a witness is lying from his demeanor and 
his reaction to probing cross-examination, there 
would appear to be little need for evidence of prior 
convictions even if the crime involves false 
statements. 492 P.2d at 657. 
The court concluded that the benefits which allegedly 
derive from the admission of prior convictions evidence 
were not sufficient to justify the use of such evidence 
against an accused in light of the great prejudicial 
harm which such evidence does to the accused in the 
eyes of the Jury. 
In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court of Utah 
has declared its policy in relation to the admission 
of evidence of prior convictions against an accused who 
testifies. The primary opinion construing Section 
78-24-9 and applying it to defendants as well as other 
witnesses is State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 
407 (1963). There, in upholding the use of such evidence 
against an accused/witness, the court stated: 
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting 
the prosecution to question the accused regarding 
prior felony convictions is to affect his credibility 
as a witness. 382 P. 2d at 409. 
However, the court held that the use of evidence which 
disclosed the details and circumstances of those crimes, 
as well as the details of other incidents which did not 
amount to formal convictions, went beyond the per~issitle 
( 12) 
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extent of the statute. As to such evidence, the court 
reasoned: 
We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial 
error. It implied that the defendant was implicated 
in other crimes, none of them proven, and could 
have no other effect than to degrade the defendant 
and give to the jury the impression that he had 
a propensity for crime. Id. 
Thus, the court drew a clear line between the use of 
evidence of prior felonies and the use of other evidence of 
similar nature. The court did not, however, declare 
a logical basis for that distinction other than the fact 
that the previous convictions were "proven" incidents. 
The rationale of the case failed to demonstrate why 
evidence of prior felony convictions should be admitted 
to impeach the defendant but not evidence of the cir-
cumstances surrounding those felonies, though the latter 
may in fact tend to lessen the prejudicial impact of 
the bare disclosure of a felony conviction in many cases, 
or be equally probative on the credibility of the witness. 
Similarly, in State v. Edwards, 368 P.2d 464, 13 Utah 
51 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court prohibited the admission 
of non-conviction evidence which was arguably more damaging 
for impeachment purposes and less prejudicial or degrading 
for substantive purposes than would be evidence of actual 
felony convictions. 
Later decisions of the court uphold other classificatory 
destinctions which appear in the Utah statutes, but 
similarly, without justifying the distinctions. Though 
the decisions state the reason for admitting evidence of 
( 13) 
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a defendant/witness's prior convictions, they fail to 
disclose why the state should then exclude other types 
of testimony which would seem to promote the same purpose 
as evidence of prior convictions. In State v. Simmons, for 
example, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld a trial court 
conviction which followed an objection to certain evidence 
by the accused. The prosecution had elicited from the 
accused evidence of a prior conviction which turned out 
on cross-examination to be a misdemeanor. The trial 
court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence on 
the grounds that it concerned a misdemeanor rather than 
a felony. The court, however, did not reveal why the 
evidence of the conviction should be relevant so long 
as it concerned a felony, but became irrelevant upon 
a finding that it was only a misdemeanor. 
2d 301, SOl P.2d 1206 (1972). 
See 28 Utah 
Certain decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have 
hinted that there is indeed no strong justification for 
the discriminatory treatment of defendant witnesses by 
the Utah laws. The court has recognized that evidence of 
prior acts may be extremely prejudicial against a defendant. 
In State v. Peterson, 23 Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532 (1969), 
the Court held that where the prosecution questioned 
the defendant about his previous use of marijuana, the 
testimony was prejudicial and required remanding the 
case for a new trial, even though the trial court had 
instructed the jury to disregard the statements, and 
regardless the empeachment value of the testimon~. 
( 14) 
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An even more questioning opinion was expressed by 
the Court in State v. Harless, 459 P.2d 210 (1969). 
There, the court stated: 
Defendant's argument on his second point is 
that asking him if he had been convicted of felony, 
and his necessary answer that he had (fictitious 
checks, and auto theft in violation of the Dyer 
Act), so prejudiced his cause in the eyes of the 
jury that he did not have a fair trial. That this 
type of interrogation is generally allowed derives 
from the idea that there is a basis in reason and 
experience why one may place more credence in the 
testimony of one who has lived within the rules 
of society and the discipline of the law than in 
that of one who has so demonstrated antisocial 
tendency as to be involved in and convicted of 
serious crime. This rule is sometimes criticized 
as unfair to the accused on the ground that he has 
but the Hobson's choice of unfavorable alternatives: 
either not to take the stand and thus lose whatever 
benefit that might have, or take it and have his 
felony record exposed, in which event he risks 
the likelihood that the jury may convict him 
because of his prior misdeeds rather than upon the 
evidence as to the instant charge .... The 
exposure of the felony record of an accused of 
course does not mean that his testimony is neccessarily 
to be entirely disbelieved or discredited, but 
inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the jury to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, it is 
deemed to be something which they are entitled 
to know so they can take it into consideration 
with all the other facts and circumstances in 
determining what they will believe. 459 P.2d at 211. 
While recognizing the weaknesses in the state's justification 
for section 76-24-9, and noting the argument usually 
made against it, the court nonetheless felt compelled 
to uphold the statute; but i~ is noteworthy that no 
constitutional argument was made, and that the court did 
not offer any justification for the provisions of the 
law prohibiting other types of evidence which would 
serve the state's purpose equally as well. 
The statutes and rules themselves do not offer any 
(1 c;;\ 
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rationale for justifying the discriminatory treatment 
of the appellant in this case. Far from that, the 
laws seem to establish just the opposite, ie that the 
construction allowing the use of felony convictions 
against the accused when he testifies as a witness is 
a clear aberration in the logic and structure of the 
laws of evidence. The statutes, for example, seem to 
place great importance upon the quality of the evidence, 
allowing its admission only if it is "legal and pertinent 
to the matter in issue" (Sec. 78-24-9), if it established 
a crime "involving dishonesty of false statement" (Rule 
21), if it refers to the character traits of truthfulness, 
honesty, or integrity of the witness (Rule 22), or if 
it is relevant to prove a material fact" (Rule 55), but 
denying its admission whenever it tends to degrade the 
character of the witness or is irrelevant (Sec. 78-24-9), 
concerns a crime not involving dishonesty or false 
statement (Rule 21), refers to character traits other 
than truthfulness, honesty, and integrity (Rule 22), 
or is used to show that the defendant had a disposition 
to commit crime (Rule 55). In light of the sweeping 
scope of section 78-24-9, which requires the admission 
of evidence of prior convictions regardless the quality 
of such evidence for impeachment or substantive purposes, 
it would seem that the legislative purpose for the body 
of laws governing admissibility of evidence in Ctah 
cannot be used to justify the discrimlnatory effects 
of section 78-24-9. 
( lG J 
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THE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
Appellant therefore asserts that the application of 
Section 78-24-9 to him in this case, whereby he was 
required to testify as to a prior felony conviction, 
violates his right to equal protection of the law. 
He submits first that the admission of his testimony 
as to a prior conviction of issuing a bad check, 
violative of Section 76-6-505, U.C.A., imposes a burden 
upon him which deters his taking the witness stand. 
The fact, in that, he is subject to the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence of his prior conviction while 
other defendants, who may also have committed felonies, 
are not required to bear the same burden. Secondly, 
appellant asserts that the rule cannot be sustained 
on the basis of the state's purpose in implementing the 
impeachment of the defendant as a witness because, as 
applied, the law bears no relation to the substantive 
or impeachment value of the evidence which it admits, 
but rather admits evidence of felonies regardless of 
hteir porbative value or relevance. Again, the law 
is without basis in logic or reason, since it is not 
closely drawn to serve the limited purpose of im-
peachment, but rather admits evidence of all felonies 
regardless of their impeachment value. 
( 17) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FAILuRE TO OBJECT 
The appellant's failure to object to the admission 
of the evidence at trail will not prevent the resolution 
of the issue on appeal, since the rule that issues not 
raised at trail will not be heard on appeal is not an 
absolute principle. The United States Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have at various times declared that there 
are exceptions to the usual practice. Thus, issues 
not raised at trial may still be dealt with on appeal 
when they concern, for example, the denial of First 
Amendment rights, Founding Church of Scientology of 
Washington, D.C. v. U.S., 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir 1969); 
equal protection of the laws, Krause v. Sacramento 
Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1973); significant questions 
of general impact on the public, Toymenka, Inc. v. 
Mount Hope Furnishing Co., 432 F. 2d 722 (4th Cir. 1970); 
and the protection of due process against manifest 
injustice, Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (lOth Cir. 1970). 
( 13) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE 
PRE-SEi~TENCE REPORT EFFECTIVELY DENIED HIM HIS RIGHTS 
TO COUNSEL AND TO CONFRONTATION OF THE WITNESSES. 
The State of Utah has no statute or rule expressly 
authorizing the use of a pre-sentence report by the court, 
nor does it have a law demanding that any such report 
used be made available to the defendant in a criminal 
case. However, the combined effect of the statutes 
dealing with the subject of sentencing is that the 
defendant must be allowed to examine any such report 
and have an opportunity to rebut the evidence contained 
therein. Otherwise, he is denied his rights of counsel 
and confrontation of the witnesses. 
Section 76-3-404 of the Utah Code implicitly 
authorize the use of pre-sentence reports and requires 
that such information be made available to the defendant. 
The statute states in part: 
In felony cases where the court is of the 
opinion that imprisonment may be appropriate but 
desires more detailed information as a basis for 
determining the sentence to be imposed than has 
been provided by the pre-sentence report, the court 
may, it its discretion, commit a convicted defendant 
to the custody of the division of corrections for 
a period. By the expiration of the period 
of commitment, or by the expiration of the additional 
time as the court shall grant, not exceeding a 
further period of ninety days, the defendant shall 
be returned to the court for sentencing, and the 
court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his attorney 
shall be provided with a written report of results 
of the study, including whatever recommendations 
the division of corrections believes will be 
helpful to a proper resolution of the case. 
By reference to the use of pre-sentence reports, and by 
the provision of this section for more detailed studies 
anu reports, tne legislature clearly evidenced its 
119) 
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intention for the courts to make use of such reports. 
By its explicit command that the more detailed type of 
report be made available to the defendant and his attorney, 
the legislature expressed an intention that the defendant 
should have access to such information whenever it will 
be used in the proceedings against him. That intention 
reasonably includes the availability to the defendant 
of the pre-sentence report itself. 
Further provisions of the Utah Code make reference 
to the right of the defendant to have access to the 
information in the pre-sentence report. Section 77-35-12 
provides that the judge, having discretion as to the 
punishment of the jefendant, may consider evidence in 
aggravation or mitigation of that punishment. 
When discretion is conferred upon the court 
as to the extent of punishment, the court, at the 
time of pronouncing judgment, may take into consid-
eration any circumstances, either in aggravation 
or mitigation of the punishment, which may then 
be presented to it by either party. 
However, whenever such evidence is used, it must be 
brought out in open court, under conditions conducive 
to the rights of the defendant to confrontation and 
representation. Section 77-35-13 mandates this result 
by stating, in part: 
The circumstances must be presented by the 
testimony of witnesses examined in open court. 
No affidavit or testimony, or representation of 
any kind, verbal or written, shall be offered to 
or received by the court or a judge thereof in 
aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, except 
as provided in this section. 
( 2 0) 
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Similar statutes have been construed by other states 
to require the submission to the defendant of a copy 
of the pre-sentence report before sentencing. In 
Kuhl v. District Court of County of Lewis and Clark, 139 
Mont. 536, 366 P.2d 347 (1961) the Supreme Court of Montana 
construed almost identical statutes, R.C.M. 1947, 
sections 94-7813 and 94-7814, to mean that the trial 
court must treat evidence contained in a pre-sentence 
report exactly as it would any other evidence in aggra-
vation or mitigation of punishment, and that the provisions 
of the statutes for hearing and examination are mandatory. 
As a policy matter, such a conclusion is recommended 
by a number of authorities. According to 40 ALR3d 
681, 699; 
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 
provides that before imposing sentence the court 
shall advise the defendant or his counsel of the 
factual contents and the conclusions of any pre-
sentence investigation or psychiatric examination 
and afford fair opportunity, if the defendant so 
requests, to controvert them. 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice recommends that in 
the absence of compelling reasons for nondisclosure 
of special infor~~tion, the defendant and his counsel 
should be permitted to examine the entire pre-
sentence report. 
And a~ American Bar Association committee 
has adopted the position that fundamental fairness 
to the defendant requires that the substance of 
all derogatory information which adversely affects 
his interest and which has not otherwise been 
disclosed in open court should be called to the 
attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others 
who are acting on his behalf. 
The United States Supreme Court has also rendered 
its opinion that the rights of the defendant often demand 
( 2l) 
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that he be given a copy of the pre-sentence report. In 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966), 
the court held that a juvenile involved in proceedings 
to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is 
entitled to copy of the social records of the juvenile 
and to have counsel to examine and refute the material 
therein. At 383 U.S. p. 563, the Court stated: 
.if the staff's submissions include 
materials which are susceptible to challenge or 
impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel 
to "denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebut-
table presumption of accuracy attached to staff 
reports. If a decision on waiver is "critically 
important" it is equally of "critical importance" 
that the mater1al submitted to the judge-which is 
protected by the statute only against "indiscriminate" 
inspection-be subjected, within reasonable limits 
having regard to the theory of the Juvenile Court 
Act, to examination, criticism and refutation. 
Similarly, in a case where t~e defendant was not represented 
by counsel and the trial court made use of information 
in the pre-sentence report, the Court held that the 
right to counsel had been violated: 
We believe that on the record before us, 
it is evident that this uncounseled defendant 
was either overreached by the prosecution's 
submission of misinformation to the court or was 
prejudiced by the court's own misreading of the 
record. Counsel, had any been present, would have 
been under a duty to prevent the court from croceeding 
on such false assumptions and perhaps under a duty 
to seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted. 
In this case, counsel might not have chanqed the 
sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that 
the conviction and sentence were not Predicated 
on misinformation or misreadina of co~rt records, 
a requirement of fair olav whi~h absence of counsel 
withheld from this pri~oner. Townsend v. Burke, 
334 u.s. 736, 740-741, 68 s.ct. 1252, 1255 (19•181. 
The manner in which the trial court 1n th~s case 
(22) 
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made use of undisclosed pre-sentence report materials is 
best illustrated by reference to the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing, in which the record shows that 
the court made the following statements in response to 
the defendant's requests for leniency: 
p. 3 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, maybe I'm misinformed, 
but it's my understanding that the Court can allow 
probation, or any other form of sentence. 
THE COURT: Well, that is a condition of 
probation, yes. But probation isn't indicated 
in Hr. Roberts case. His record is too long. 
He has been in trouble too much 
* * * * 
THE COURT: He has had probation revoked twice 
and he has had parole revoked twice. That's right, 
isn't it? 
p. 5 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Roberts, but I'm 
afraid as far as giving you a chance on probation 
now is too late. I'm sure that what you do in the 
Utah State Prison with regard to pursuing what you're 
telling me you have got to do will affect when you 
can be released from there. And the seriousness 
of your desire to reform your life can be shown 
there. I can't put you on probation. I'm sorry. 
I would like to; it hurts me that I have to send 
anyone to prison, but I have no alternative in your 
case. Is there any legal reason why I shouldn't 
proceed to pronounce judgment, Hr. Carter: 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, we have not been supplied 
with a copy of the pre-sentence report in this 
matter. I would object to that. I think we would 
be entitled to it, to a copy of it, or at least 
knowledge as to what the facts of it are. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll order that a copy of 
Mr. Robert's record be made available to you. * * * 
Following the dialogue quoted above, the court 
orocceded to judgment and sentencing without delay. 
(2 3) 
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Appellant contends that these procedures violated his 
rights to counsel and to confrontatioD of witnesses 
because of the fact that the court relied upon information 
in the pre-sentence report, both disclosed information 
and information which was not disclosed, in making its 
decision not to place the appellant on probation. 
Inasmuch as Sections 77-35-12 and 77-35-13 of the Utah Code 
provide that all materials, whether written or oral, used 
in determination of punishment, must be submitted in 
open court for the purpose of allowing the defendant to 
appraise and rebute the evidence against him with the 
aid of confrontation and counsel, the appellant here 
was effectively denied his rights by being sentenced 
before a pre-sentence report had been made available 
to him. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits, therefore, 
that his conviction should be reversed on the grounds 
that the trial court's admission of evidence concerning 
a prior conviction denied him equal protection of the 
laws and was prejudicial error. Further, and in the 
alternative, appellant requests that his sentence be 
terminated on the grounds that the trial court's refusal 
to provide appellant with a copy of the ?re-sentence 
report prior to sentencing denied appellant his right 
to confrontation and counsel. 
(2 4) 
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I 2 ~ l 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
·t(~ 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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